Maryland Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 3

Article 9

The State as a Party Defendant: Abrogation of
Sovereign Immunity in Tort in Maryland

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
The State as a Party Defendant: Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in Tort in Maryland, 36 Md. L. Rev. 653 (1977)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/9

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

THE STATE AS A PARTY DEFENDANT: ABROGATION
OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN TORT IN MARYLAND
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State of Maryland is
immune from liability for its torts. The doctrine is well settled in Maryland' and has roots in the development of the law of the states 2 and the
federal government.3 The essence of the doctrine is that neither the state
nor its agencies and instrumentalities 4 can be sued in the state courts for
tortious conduct without prior legislative consent. 5 Many jurisdictions
have abrogated the doctrine, either judicially 6 or legislatively. 7 Although
1. See Jekof sky v. State Roads Comm'n, 264 Md. 471, 287 A.2d 40 (1972);
Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 260 A2d 295 (1970) ; State v. Rich, 126
Md. 643, 95 A. 956 (1915); State v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 34 Md. 344 (1871), aff'd,
Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456 (1875); Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort
Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1363, 1382 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Black v. Rempublicam, 1 Yates 140 (Pa. 1792), one of the earliest
American cases at the state level. "[T]he state courts adopted this doctrine to preclude
claims against the state and its subordinate governmental entities." Note, Notice of
Claim Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 417, 419
n.13 (1975).
3. The Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the
federal government in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). See also
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
4.
As applied in Maryland, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not only
applicable to the State, itself, as a governmental agency, but is also applicable to
its agencies and instrumentalities, including its municipal political sub-divisions,
if engaged in a governmental function as an agent of the State, unless the General
Assembly either directly or by necessary implication has waived the immunity.
Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 334, 260 A.2d 295, 299 (1970). See Comment, Municipal Responsibility in Tort in Maryland, 3 MD. L. REv. 159, 160-61 (1939).
5. See Note, Claims Against the State of Ohio: Sovereign Immunity, The
Sundry Claims Board and the Proposed Court of Claims Act, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 462
(1974). Compare Weddle v. Board of County School Comm'rs, 94 Md. 334, 51 A.
289 (1902) with Jekofsky v. State, 264 Md. 471, 478, 287 A.2d 40, 41 (1972). See
generally 80 RESEARCH RESULTS DIGEST, LIABILITIES OF STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENTS FOR DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE DEFECTS 5-8 (1975).
The
Maryland General Assembly has recently abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity in contract. 1976 Laws of Md., ch. 450, at 1180.
6. See, e.g., Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 878 (Pa. 1973);
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 624 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962);
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457
(1961). See also Comment, To Catch the Elusive Conscience of the King: The
Status of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Alabama, 26 ALA. L. REv. 463, 465
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Sovereign Immunity in Alabama].
7. States that have legislatively abrogated the doctrine include Alaska (Alaska
Stat. § 09.50.250 [1973]), Oregon (Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 30.260-30.300 [1975]), and
Washington (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.92.010 [1962], as amended [1975 Cum.
Supp.]). See generally Comment, The Governmental Immunity Doctrine in Texas An Analysis and Some Proposed Changes, 23 S.W.L.J. 341, 362-70 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Immunity Doctrine in Texas].
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the judiciary has often served as a catalyst for legislative reform,8 the
Court of Appeals' insistence that abrogation must come, if at all, from
the legislature 9 reduces the likelihood of such an initiative by the Maryland
courts. Since consent to be sued has rarely been granted in Maryland,
tort victims often bear the entire cost of their injuries when the state
government is the tortfeasor. 10
This Comment first examines the development of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, focusing on the historical context in which it arose
in England and the early rationales advanced for its use in the United
States. The application of the doctrine in Maryland indicates that it has
been based not only on a theory of sovereignty but also on considerations
of public policy. Analysis of the various public policy considerations,
however, reveals that the state should retain its immunity only in those
limited areas related to the performance of governmental functions that
are unique to the government or involve discretionary decision-making.
Outside these perimeters, the legislature should abrogate the state's
immunity. Several types of liability statutes are evaluated, and recommendations are made for legislative change.
HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND TREATMENT BY
MARYLAND JUDICIARY
Sovereign immunity originated as one of the personal prerogatives

of the King of England and derived from the theory that the highest feudal
lord was not subject to suit in his own courts." How the doctrine came
8. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN
THE LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS 28-30 (Jan. 1975)
cited as LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT].

IMMUNITY:
[hereinafter

9. See, e.g., Jekofsky v. State, 264 Md. 471, 474, 287 A.2d 40, 41 (1972);
Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 260 A.2d 295 (1970).
10. Cf. Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the Emperor Has No
Clothes, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 828, 830 (Mikva discusses the consequences when the
federal government is the tortfeasor; however, the impact is the same when the state
government is the tortfeasor).
11. 1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 518

(3d ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as POLLACK & MAITLAND]; Note, Equal Protection
and State Immunity From Tort Liability, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 716 n.4 [hereinafter
cited as Note, Equal Protection].
The immunity of the King of England from suit "was not based on any
idea that he could do no wrong; his was . . . simply a further application of the
ordinary and generally accepted principle that no feudal lord could be sued in his
own courts." R. WATKINS, THE STATE As A PARTY LITIGANT 7 (1927) [hereinafter
cited as WATKINS]. See 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW
462 (1922). Until the decline of the feudal system in the sixteenth century, the
sovereign's immunity was a purely personal right; the king "was not considered as
endowed with any non-natural attributes ." WATKINS, supra at 8.
The doctrine operated as a jurisdictional bar to suits against the king in his
law courts. Note, Equal Protection, supra, at 716 n.4. Relief was usually available,
however, by means of the "petition of right" to the courts of equity, which could be
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to be applied to the state in addition to the monarch is "one of the mysteries
of legal evolution."' 12 There is some evidence that the ancient maxim
"the king can do no wrong" was misunderstood and was thought to apply
13
generally to the substantive acts of the king. Regardless of its source,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which had become firmly embedded
in the law of England, was adopted by the legal system of the newly
14
Although its application in the postestablished American democracy.
with a theory of government in
inconsistent
revolutionary era appeared
15
and in which there was no
sovereign
considered
which the people were
denied only by the king's affirmative exercise of his prerogative rather than by an
automatic jurisdictional bar. Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the
Crown, 38 L.Q. R~v. 141, 149-50 (1922); POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra at 512-18.
12. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924). See
WATKINS, supranote 11, at 11-13.
13. Borchard, supra note 12, at 2 n.2.
[T]he expression "the King can do no wrong" originally meant precisely the
contrary to what it later came to mean. "[I]t meant that the King . . .was
not . . . entitled to do wrong .

. . ."

It was on this basis that the King, though

not suable in his court . . . nevertheless endorsed on petitions "let justice be
done," thus empowering his courts to proceed.
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 4 (1963).
14. See Borchard,supra note 12, at 4.
The Supreme Court in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
held that article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution gave jurisdiction to
federal courts to adjudicate "[c]ontroversies . . . between a State and Citizens of
another State" irrespective of an assertion of sovereign immunity by the defendant
state. The reaction in the country was so strong that the eleventh amendment was
enacted, effectively reversing the result in Chisolm. See Tribe, Intergovernmental
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues
in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 HARV. L. Rxv. 682, 683-88 (1976). Nevertheless, Chisolm reflects the Court's early view that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was alien to the prevailing notions of governmental responsibility.
It has been suggested that the fourteenth amendment might limit the availability of the defense of sovereign immunity, even in an action not involving federal
legislation expressly mandating that result. See, e.g., Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d
1166 (5th Cir. 1976). The fifth circuit in Jagnandan held that the fourteenth amendment "does not preempt the operation of the Eleventh Amendment's bar against
recovery of . . . excess tuition payments from the state in a federal court." Id. at
1184. The court noted, however, that its holding might be affected by a case currently
pending before the Supreme Court, Rabinovitch v. Nyquist, petition for cert. filed 44
U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S., June 14, 1976) (No. 75-1809). 538 F.2d at 1185. Rabinovitch
raised the question "whether the Fourteenth Amendment, of its own force and absent
enforcement legislation, constitutes a limitation to the Eleventh Amendment's bar to
awarding money judgments against the state in a federal court." Id. (footnote
omitted). See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976) ; Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1973) ; Comment, Edelman v. Jordan: The Case of the Vanishing
Retroactive Benefit and the Reappearing Defense of Sovereign Immunity, 12 Hos.
L. REv. 891 (1975).
15. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879). The Maryland Court
of Appeals in Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 333, 260 A.2d 295, 298
(1970), and the United States Supreme Court in Langford, 101 U.S. at 343, have
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central figure from whom authority derived, 16 the immunity doctrine
prevailed.
One practical consideration arose at the conclusion of the American
Revolution that provided a compelling justification for retaining the immunity doctrine. The federal and state governments were heavily in debt
and this precarious financial condition necessitated the protection of government coffers from further strain. 17 Early American cases, both federal and
state, provided little additional justification for invoking the doctrine,'8
and after the initial financial crisis subsided, it was perpetuated primarily
by rules of stare decisis. 19
Theoretical explanations of the American doctrine came much later.
Long after the first application of the doctrine in this country, Justice
Holmes observed that "[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law upon which the right depends. '20 This theory resembled the
"personal prerogative" justification that had developed in feudal England ;21
because the government acts as the representative of the people, who are
sovereign, it is vested with attributes of sovereignty and is thereby imrejected application of the maxim "the King can do no wrong" to the American
system of government.
16. See Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 333. 260 A.2d 295, 298 (1970).

See also WATKINS, supra note 11, at 11-13; Borchard, supra note 12, at 4.
17. WATKINS, supra note 11, at 52-54; Molberg, The Texas Tort Claims
Act - Problems in Federal Court, 29 S.W.L.J. 600 (1975) ; Sherry, The Myth
that the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine in the United States and New York Court of Claims, 22 AD. L. REV. 39,
56 (1969) ; Note, Sovereign Immunity - Should the King Remove His Armor?, 53
N.C.L. REV. 1114, 1115 n.7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Sovereiqn Immunity];
8 U. RicH. L. REV. 372. 373 (1974). The concern over fiscal consequences even
extended to a fear that suits would be brought for restitution of property taken from
loyalists during the American Revolution. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 683 n.5.
18. Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States
1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 795, 801. Representative state cases include Black v.
.Rempublicam, 1 Yeates 140 (Pa. 1792) and Commonwealth v. Colquhouns, 13 Va.
(2 Hen. & M.) 213 (1808). Representative early federal cases include Hill v.
United States, 50 U.S. 386 (1850) and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821). See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 971 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].

19. See Perkins v. State, 251 N.E.2d 30, 33 (Ind. 1969). See also Haney v.
City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Ky. 1964).
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
20. Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
21. See notes 11 to 14 and accompanying text supra.
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mune.2 2 The Maryland Court of Appeals embraced this theory of soverignty as a rationale for immunity in its 1871 decision in State v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.2 3 The court stated that sovereign immunity "belongs
to the State by reason of her prerogative as a sovereign, and on grounds
of public policy. Parties having claims or demands against her must
present them through another department of the Government - the
Legislature - and cannot assert them by suit in the courts. '24
The continuing validity of this sovereignty rationale in Maryland is
doubtful, however, in view of the statement of the Court of Appeals in
Godwin v. County Commissioner2 5 that
[t]he application of the doctrine in this country was most likely
based more upon reasons of public policy than upon the concept of
the new States or the United States being successors, as it were, of
the former king. Indeed, it is clear in Maryland that public policy
26
was a consideration for the application of this doctrine.
The Godwin court thus suggested that considerations of public policy constituted the major rationale for the tort immunity of the State of Maryland. Public policy has long been asserted as a basis for immunity.2 7 An
early Maryland case indicated that the fact that some state agencies were
"charged with the exercise of an important government function" 28 was
sufficient to mandate treatment different from that accorded other party
defendants. Only recently has the Court of Appeals identified the aspects
of public policy that require immunity. In Godwin, the court stated that
"[w]hen one considers the financial and other problems which might arise
if the doctrine of sovereign immunity were not applicable, it was probably
wise that our predecessors did apply it in Maryland. '2 9 Additional policy
considerations were identified in Jekofsky v. State Roads Commission,3 0
22. But see Note, Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability: Has the
Rationale Disappeared?, 39 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 252, 255 (1970-1971) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Has the Rationale Disappeared?].
23. 34 Md. 344 (1871).
24. Id. at 374. Several Maryland cases have expressly relied upon Baltimore
& O.R.R. See, e.g., Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 260 A.2d 295
(1970) ; Williams v. Fitzhugh, 147 Md. 384, 128 A. 137 (1925).
25. 256 Md. 326, 260 A.2d 295 (1970).
26. Id. at 333, 260 A.2d at 298.
27. Public policy justifications were first advanced in a general, unspecific
manner in State v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 34 Md. 344, 374 (1871).
28. State v. Rich, 126 Md. 643, 645, 95 A. 956, 957 (1915). See also Jones v.
Scofield Bros. Co., 73 F. Supp. 395, 396 (D. Md. 1947). This policy consideration
is crucial in balancing the social policy of compensating injured victims against the
possible disruption of government functions. See text accompanying notes 81 to 87
infra.
29. 256 Md. at 333, 260 A.2d at 298.
30. 264 Md. 471, 287 A2d 40 (1972). In Jekofsky, the plaintiff brought an
action to recover for injuries sustained when he lost control of his automobile and
struck a utility pole. He alleged that the accident was caused by negligent construction of the highway.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL,. 36

which held that the doctrine immunized the State Roads Commission.
The court in Jekofsky stated that judicial abrogation of the doctrine would
be unwise in view of several policy considerations, such as "fiscal considerations, administrative difficulties and other problems in balancing the
rights of the State and its agencies with new possibl6 rights of the individual citizens."3 1
Because the "sovereignty" rationale is no longer viewed as a persuasive basis for the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the doctrine's continued application must be explained by reference to considerations of
public policy. While the Court of Appeals has not assessed the relative
importance of the various policy considerations, its recognition that the
doctrine depends on dynamic economic and political foundations of public
policy is significant. In view of the court's continued insistence that
abrogation must come from the legislature,82 however, further judicial
scrutiny of the underlying policies appears unlikely. Therefore, the remaining sections of this Comment will analyze the competing policy considerations and explore different forms of statutory abrogation.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The adoption and perpetuation of sovereign immunity in this country
has been justified on five policy grounds. First, state funds that are
devoted to public purposes should not be diverted to compensate private
injuries.3 3 Second, the imposition of liability would have disastrous financial consequences.3 4 Third, sovereign immunity ensures that the govern31. Id. at 474, 287 A.2d at 42.
32. See, e.g., id. at 474, 287 A.2d at 41; Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs,
262 Md. 342, 345, 278 A.2d 71, 73 (1971); Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 104,
271 A.2d 547, 550 (1970) ; Wiggins v. State, 22 Md. App. 291, 324 A.2d 172 (1974),
aff'd on other grounds,275 Md. 689, 344 A.2d 80 (1975).
Nor may a state agency waive the defense of sovereign immunity without
legislative consent. In Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 288-89, 159 A. 751, 757, cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 564 (1932), the Court of Appeals stated that "[c]ourts should
not hold that immunity from suit, one of the highest attributes of sovereignty, has
been waived, except in cases of positive consent given, or by necessary and compelling
implication." Sovereign immunity is not automatically waived by the purchase of
liability insurance or the authorization to purchase such insurance. Jones v. Scofield,
73 F. Supp. 395 (D. Md. 1947).
Counsel for the state or one of its agencies may not waive the defense of
governmental immunity - either intentionally or by failure to plead the defense via
a motion raising preliminary objections, MD. R.P. 323(b) - in the absence of express
or clearly implied statutory authority. Board of Educ. v. Alcrymat Corp., 258 Md.
508, 266 A.2d 349 (1970).
33. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF ToRTs 1611-12 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as HARPER & JAMES]; PROSSER, supra note 18, at 975. See Repko, American Legal
Commentary on the Doctrine of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
214, 220 (1942).
34. See Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 333, 260 A.2d 295, 298 (1970)
(dictum); Payne v. County of Jackson, 483 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Mo. 1972); Note,
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 17, at 1118.
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ment is not subject to "endless embarrassments, and difficulties, and losses,
which would be subversive of the public interests."85 Fourth, some functions of government are so uniquely governmental and involve such a high
degree of risk that the government should not be subjected to liability for
undertaking to perform them.86 Finally, it is contended that the threat of
liability would hamper the effective exercise of discretionary functions. a7
Each of these policy arguments can be countered in turn by persuasive
arguments against immunity. Furthermore, these countervailing arguments
are consistent with the two primary reasons for imposing tort liability compensation of injured persons and deterrence of tortious conduct.8 s An
evaluation of the immunity doctrine therefore entails analysis of these
contrary policy considerations.
Diversion of Public Funds
Sovereign immunity has been justified on the ground that it would
be improper to divert public funds to private purposes.89 It is asserted
that funds already allocated to specific purposes are held in "trust" for
those ends 40 and that the remainder of the nonallocated general revenues
35. J. STORY, AGENCY LAW § 319 (9th ed. 1882). See also PRossER, supra note
18, at 975.
36. Note, Claims Against the State of Ohio: The Need for Reform, 36 U. CIN.
L. REv. 239, 250 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Need For Reform]. See Van
Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L
REv. 463, 468-69 (1963).
37. David, The Tort Liability of Public Officers, 12 S. CAL. L. REv. 260, 283
(1939); Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity, 36
S. CAL. L. REv. 161, 180-81 (1963). See 5 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION CoMMIssIoN,
A STUDY RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 255-56 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY STUDY].

38. See Kennedy and Lynch, supra note 37, at 178; Note, State Immunity from
Suit Without Consent - Scope and Implications, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 879, 884 [hereinafter cited as Note, State Immunity from Suit].
39. See Repko, supra note 33, at 220; cf. Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort
Liability in Operation, 54 H~Av. L. REv. 437, 440 (1941) (where municipal entities
are involved, immunity has been based on the argument that liability is precluded in
the absence of statutory establishment of a fund that could satisfy tort judgments).
40. See, e.g., Jekofsky v. State, 264 Md. 471, 287 A.2d 40 (1972); Lohr v.
Upper Potomac River Comm'n, 180 Md. 584, 26 A.2d 547 (1942); State v. Rich,
126 Md. 643, 95 A. 956 (1915). Where governmental powers and functions have been
delegated by statute to agencies of the state, the state's immunity extends to them.
Compare Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. at 334, 260 A.2d at 298 with State v.
Rich, 126 Md. at 645, 95 A. at 957 and Jones v. Scofield Bros., 73 F. Supp. 395,
396 (D. Md. 1947). Once it is determined that the entity is an agency of the state,
the inquiry focuses upon whether the statute creating the agency subjects it to tort
liability. See Lohr v. Upper Potomac River Comm'n, 180 Md. at 588-90, 26 A. at
548-50. The conclusion that a statute creating a state agency or instrumentality does
not permit it to be held liable in tort has often been based upon the theory that the
agency's funds are held in "trust" for specific purposes, which do not include paying
damages in tort cases. Compare State v. Rich, 126 Md. at 646, 95 A. at 957 with
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should not be applied to a few tort judgments affecting only a minute
segment of the community. 41 But this argument does not adequately
consider the expansion of government activities and the growth of the
state budgets in recent decades. When government weakness and an
apprehension of financial collapse were legitimate concerns, sovereign immunity may have been an appropriate response ;42 on balance, the need for
ensuring forthright decision-making and a solid economic structure outweighed the unfortunate result of individuals suffering uncompensated
losses. 43

Yet in the course of social and economic growth, the need for

44
adequate protection of the private person may have been overlooked.
One commentator has remarked that the increased productivity and wealth
resulting from growth of government "makes it unnecessary that risks
45
assumed by the individual 200 years ago be assumed by him today.
Where the pursuit of the public purpose causes injury, the cost of injury
should merely be considered part of the cost of that activity, as in any
private business. 46 That it would not be inherently inappropriate to compensate private injuries from government funds is further supported by
the imposition of municipal liability according to the "governmental func-

tion"/"proprietary function" dichotomy. 4 7 Under this approach, a munici-

pality is liable where its tortious activity is proprietary or corporate in
nature.48 The courts have thus recognized that in a wide range of funcWeddle v. Board of County School Comm'rs, 94 Md. 334, 336, 51 A. 289, 290-91
(1902) and Jones v. Scofield, 73 F. Supp. at 397-98.
The "no funds" or "trust fund" rationale, first applied in Maryland to the
state as a party defendant in Rich, has its roots in Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng.
Rep. 359 (1788), an early English case involving an action in tort against the individual members of an unincorporated town. The King's Bench refused to impose
liability because there was no fund available to satisfy a judgment Id. at 360-61.
The court stated that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than
that the public should suffer an inconvenience." Id. at 362.
41. See David, Public Tort Liability Administration: Basic Conflicts and
Problems, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 335, 340-41 (1942).
42. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
43. Compare Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 406-07 (1821) with
Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 360-61 (1788).
44. See Anderson, Claims Against States, 7 VAND. L. REv. 234, 245 (1954).
45. Power, New Wealth and New Harms - The Case For Broadened Governmental Liability, 23 RUTGERs L. REv. 449, 451 (1969).
46. Repko, supra note 33, at 216-17.
47. For discussion of the governmental/proprietary function dichotomy, see
Note, Liability of Municipal Corporations Under the State's Statutory Waiver of
Tort Immunity, 20 MD. L. REv. 353 (1960); Comment, Municipal Responsibility in
Tort in Maryland, 3 MD. L. Rav. 159 (1939). See also E. Kelleher, Sovereign
Immunity in Maryland 5-6, 8-9 (Feb. 1976) (This study was prepared for the Maryland Technical Advisory Service, Bureau of Governmental Research, Division of
Behavioral and Social Sciences of the University of Maryland. The study is on file
at the Maryland Law Review.).
48. Kionka, The King is Dead, Long Live the King: State Sovereign Immunity
in Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 660, 664 (1971).
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tions, 49 the public funds of governmental entities can be properly diverted
to the satisfaction of tort judgments.
Financial Impact

The second policy argument for maintaining the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in tort assumes the theoretical propriety of spending public
funds to compensate private injuries but emphasizes the potentially disastrous financial consequences of liability. The concern over financial
consequences has been particularly acute where dangerous government
activities, such as fire fighting, law enforcement, highway maintenance, and
incarceration are involved. 50 Since these vital services are likely to be
a source of many injuries, it is feared that the cost of tort liability would
increase so drastically that other services, such as parks and recreation,
would have to be curtailed to ensure the performance of more essential
functions. 5x Adherents to this point of view therefore argue that elimination of liability should be conditioned upon a limitation on the scope of
liability or the availability of reasonably priced insurance. 52
Although there is evidence that the cost of liability would be substantial,5 3 "the spectre of the crippling judgment" 54 is unrealistic. Jurisdictions that have abrogated immunity generally have not suffered undue
economic strain,5 5 and the existing empirical data do not reveal a rash
49. See, e.g., Reed v. Mayor of Baltimore, 171 Md. 115, 118 A. 15 (1936)
(market) ; Mayor of Baltimore v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128, 173 A. 56 (1936) (highways) ;
Consol. Apartment House Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 131 Md. 523, 102 A. 920 (1917)
(trash removal).
50. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 177.
51. Id. at 178. See Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 276, 195 A. 571,
576 (1937).
52. See Payne v. County of Jackson, 484 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Mo. 1972).
53. See Letter from Robert S. Spear, Assistant Attorney General, Claims and
Compensation Section, State of Indiana, to Hon. Nolan H. Rogers, Chairman, Maryland Commission to Study Sovereign Immunity, October 9, 1975. (The letter is on
file at the Maryland Law Review). The letter indicates that two hundred and sixtythree lawsuits were then pending against the State of Indiana in the amount of $96
million. It should be noted, however, that this is the amount of the prayers in all
suits then pending and may not reflect the ultimate fiscal impact since it is unlikely
that the plaintiff will prevail in every case.
54. David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to Immunity From
Liability or Suit 8-14, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Tort
Liability of Local Government]. See also Parrish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1250-51,
429 S.W.2d 45, 51 (1968).
55. Governor's Commission to Study Sovereign Immunity, Report of the
Governor's Commission to Study Sovereign Immunity 41 (November 1976) [hereinafter cited as Report], where it was reported that "the impact in most cases has not
been fiscally disastrous." (The study is on file at the Maryland Law Review.) ; cf.
Comment, Sovereign Immunity in Alabama, supra note 6, at 483 (relying on Ayala
v. Board of Public Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 882-83 (Pa. 1973)).
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of excessive judgments." Moreover, private corporations have weathered
the imposition of liability without severe financial difficulty; there is little
7
reason to believe that the government experience will differ greatly.
Nevertheless, the virtual impossibility of accurately predicting the economic
ramifications of abrogation might favor the selection of a statute retaining
some limitations on the scope of liability. 8
Regardless of the severity of the adverse judgments, the availability
of liability insurance should substantially alleviate the deleterious financial
effects.8 9 By purchasing insurance a state can plan the fiscal consequences
of liability on a more predictable basis and thereby temper the burden on
its resources.8 0 Some authorities, however, doubt that the procurement
of liability insurance will reduce the ultimate financial impact because
"[i]nsurance premium rates naturally depend on loss experience, and if a
high degree of public liability is imposed . . . the cost to taxpayers of
insurance will be correspondingly great." 61 The problem would be particularly acute in a state with a blanket waiver of immunity, because insurance
carriers might confront an uncertain degree of risk.62 In this regard,
the recent experience in the State of Florida is significant. Florida abrogated state and municipal immunity by enacting a blanket waiver statute
that extended the general principles of tort law to state and municipal
tortfeasors. 63 Florida has a population 85 percent larger than that of

56. See Tort Liability of Local Government, supra note 54, at 8-14; Spanel v.
Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 290-92, 118 N.W.2d 795, 802-03 (1962).
57. See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966
U. ILL. L.F. 919, 921 & n.18 [hereinafter cited as Decade of Change], citing Williams
v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 259, 111 N.W.2d 1, 24 (1961) (Edwards, J.).
58. See notes 114 to 122 and accompanying text infra.
59. See Decade of Change, supra note 57, at 921 & n.18; Tort Liability of
Local Government, supra note 54, at 45-47, 51 ; cf. Note, Need for Reform, supra note
36, at 249 (it is noted that liability insurance will not completely eliminate the effects
since the cost of insurance may be substantial in proportion to the degree of liability
assumed).

60. Cf. 4 CALIFORNIA LAW

REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION RELATING

811 (1963) [hereinafter cited as RECOMMENDATION] (insurance, under a statute providing for immunity except in specified areas, will provide
a basis upon which to plan the fiscal consequences of liability).
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61. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 178. "A further observation is that liability insurance plays a major role in tempering the fiscal impact of the abrogation
of sovereign immunity in tort." Report, supra note 55, at 42.
62. See generally Note, Need For Reform, supra note 36, at 249. It is noteworthy
that Kennedy and Lynch concluded that under an open-end waiver approach to
abrogation the cost of insurance would be difficult to calculate. Kennedy & Lynch,
supra note 37, at 179. It would appear that the cost would be even less predictable
with the blanket waiver approach.
63. FLA.STAT. ANN. § 768.28-.30 (West Supp. 1976).
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Maryland 4 and employs 50 percent more government workers. 65 In
fiscal year 1974, Florida paid a premium of approximately 5.5 million
dollars to cover claims arising under the statute, which limits the maximum
recovery by any one individual to $50,000.66

Given the differences in

demographic factors and the fact that the premium in Florida covers both
state and municipal liability,6 7 a Maryland state liability insurance premium

should be substantially lower than that of Florida. In fiscal year 1974, the
total net cash expenditures by the State of Maryland were 2.5 billion
dollars ;68 a premium of even 5.5 million dollars would constitute less than
one-fifth of one percent of annual expenditures. Thus, while abrogation of
immunity will have some fiscal impact, it does not appear that the financial
burden on state resources will be oppressive.
Effect Upon Functioning .df Government
Sovereign immunity has been justified on the ground that the imposition of liability would entangle the government "in endless embarrassments,
and difficulties, and losses, which would be subversive of the public interests" by inhibiting performance of government functions. 69 This policy
rationale raises the question whether society is better served by a system
of government immunity that leaves tort victims uncompensated or by a
system of liability that spreads the financial burden but permits interference with government activity. The purpose of state immunity, like
the corresponding doctrine of official immunity,70 is to ensure uninhibited
"vigorous, and effective administration" of the government.7 1 One of the
serious effects of imposing liability is that the government official whose
64. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 12
(1974). Maryland ranked 18th in population size with 4,070,000 persons; Florida
ranked 8th in population size with 7,678,000. These were the July 1, 1973 figures.
65. Id. at 266. The State of Maryland employed 62,000 persons in the state
government; the State of Florida employed 96,000 persons in its state government.
These were the July 1, 1973 figures.
66. Letter from Philip F. Ashler, Florida Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer,
and James E. Bearden, Chief, Florida Bureau of Casualty Risk Retention, to Nolan
H. Rogers, Special Assistant Attorney General, State Highway Administration
(Sept. 3, 1975). (The letter is on file at the Maryland Law Review.) Mr. Rogers
is the Chairman of the Commission to Study Sovereign Immunity which was established by Governor Marvin Mandel in 1975. The Florida statute is located at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.28-.30 (1973).

67. See

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West Supp. 1976).
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
MARYLAND STATISTICAL ABSTRACr 1975, at 164.
69. J. STORY, AGENCY LAW § 319 (9th ed. 1882) ; cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.

68.

564, 571 (1959)

(official immunity).

See generally PROSSER, supra note 18, at 970.

See also Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 271, 195 A. 571, 574 (1937).
70. Public officers are immune from suit for tortious conduct because society
desires that they make decisions freely, and it is feared liability might hamper the
governmental process. See PROSSER, supra note 18, at 987.
71. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959), quoted in Carter v. Carlson, 447
F.2d 358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
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conduct was allegedly tortious might be distracted by discovery, trial
preparation, investigations, and other factors inherent in the litigation
process. Nevertheless, tort defendants in the private sector have often
tolerated such distractions so that individuals could be made whole. Arguably, government officials ought to be equally tolerant of such intrusions
so that the objective of compensation can be realized.
Liability clearly imposes burdens upon the government, but these
burdens may become a less compelling basis for immunity when compared
to the harm inflicted upon tort victims. 72 In measuring the competing

needs, it is significant that the victim "bears the entire, sometimes calamitous, burden resulting from [government activity] ...undertaken for the
benefit of the entire community" 73 while the government assumes little
or no responsibility. 74 This allocation of risk is incongrous because the
government is in the ideal position to spread the losses occasioned by its
activities, much in the same manner as large businesses absorb the financial impact of adverse judgments.7 5 Application of principles derived from
the recently developed risk theory of tort liability might provide a method
72. For example, in discussing sovereign immunity in a federal civil rights
case, Judge Celebrezze observed that "[tihe burden upon state officials to defend
against these suits - the nonmeritorious as well as the meritorious - is but a small
price to pay for the protection of constitutional rights." Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d
430, 458 (6th Cir. 1972) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). While liability burdens the government and immunity
burdens the injured citizen, a balancing of these interests does not involve constitutional questions. Yet many victims of government torts who have suffered serious
injury or death have been denied recovery merely because of the fortuitous circumstance that the government was the tortfeasor. See, e.g., State v. Rich, 126 Md. 643,
95 A. 956 (1915) (plaintiff's decedent fell over an unmarked roadside embankment
and was killed) ; Weddle v. Board of School Comm'rs, 94 Md. 334, 51 A. 289
(1902) (school girl was thrown to the ground and received fatal injury due to a
negligently strung wire on school grounds). See generally Mikva, supra note 10,
at 830-31.
73. Parrish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1247, 429 S.W.2d 45, 49 (1968).
74. See, e.g., Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm'n, 264 Md. 471, 287 A.2d 40 (1972)
(State Roads Commission immune); Lohr v. Upper Potomac River Comm'n, 180
Md. 584, 26 A.2d 547 (1942) (state flood control commission immune) ; Davis v.
State, 183 Md. 385, 392-93, 37 A.2d 880, 885 (1944) (State Board of Medical
Examiners immune).
75. See Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. REv. 751, 811
(1956).
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1952), in which the
federal government assumed liability for its torts in a wide range of areas, is a good
example of government assumption of risk-spreading responsibilities. The federal
government continues to perform its functions despite this broad exposure to liability. See Stason, Governmental Tort Liability Symposium, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1318,
1322 (1954). See generally Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Liability For Personal and
Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1325 (1954). The loss has been spread among
the taxpayers of the United States - the broad community of beneficiaries for whom
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for compromising the conflicting interests.7 6 The risk concept imposes
liability without regard to fault on the theory that losses should be spread
equally throughout the community receiving the benefit from the injuryproducing activity.77 Moreover, this assumption of responsibility may
induce change in the structure and policies of government by prompting an
evaluation of the circumstances that allowed the injury to occur.78 The
benefits of applying the risk-sharing theory of tort liability appear to
outweigh the potential interference with general government functions
attributable to the defense of tort litigation. Nevertheless, the risk theory
should not completely replace the notion of liability based upon fault because a no-fault system of absolute liability might allow recovery by
the risks of potential injury producing activity are undertaken. Justice Traynor
articulated some of the reasoning behind this risk theory in a products liability case:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business. . . . IT]he manufacturer is best situated to afford
such protection.

Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(concurring opinion). By accepting liability and distributing the losses as widely as
possible, the government has ameliorated the results of the defective social engineering
that placed the entire risk on the victim. Borchard, supra note 12, at 8.
76. Tort liability rests upon one of two major theories, the fault theory, PRossER,
supra note 18, at 492-93, or the risk theory, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY, supra
note 37, at 271-72. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 33, at 759-84. Under the

more traditional fault theory, liability falls on the person or entity at fault for the
injury; imposition of liability reflects the view that personal responsibility, "individualism and self-reliance" should be the standard of social policy. SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 37, at 271. See PROSSER, supra note 18, at 492-93.
"[M]odern tort law appears to consist of an amalgam of both fault and risk theories,
with steadily developing pressures in favor of extending the latter approach."
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 37, at 272.
77. See Comment, Role of the Courts In Abolishing Governmental Immunity,
1964 DUKE L.J. 888, 890; Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 176. See generally
Stason, supra note 75, at 1323-24. See also PROSSER, supra note 18, at 493-94.
78. Note, State Immunity From Suit Without Consent - Scope and Implications, 1971 Wis. L REV. 879, 880 n.8. The writer suggests that the provision for
state liability would provide a beneficial institutional channel for social change:
Each society must provide adequate means to facilitate social change. Otherwise, social institutions become so rigid and outdated that they fail to provide
for the society's basic needs. Full liability of the state in tort is essential to such
a scheme for three reasons: (1) the possibility of full recovery for injury
provides the injured with the initial incentive to bring his action against the
state in a court of law, thereby maximizing uses of institutional channels for
bringing about change; (2) when the state is ordered to compensate the injured
individual its compliance serves as a recognition of mistake; and (3) decisions
against the state in a court of law are likely to motivate change in the governing
structure that caused the injury to occur.
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A system

of circumscribed liability would protect many innocent victims from suffering uncompensated injuries and would enable the risk-spreading mechanism
to distribute the losses.80
Unique Governmental Functions

Sovereign immunity has also been justified on the basis that liability
would interfere with performance of unique government functions. Functions generally characterized as "unique" include highway maintenance, law
enforcement, fire fighting, incarceration, licensing, and quarantine.,' It has
been argued that immunity should be retained for these unique governmental
functions because they cannot be performed by the private sector, they involve a high degree of unavoidable risk, or they involve unprofitable services
that private enterprise might readily abandon whereas the state government
must continue to perform them for reasons of public health, safety, or
welfare.8 2 Although compensation might be desirable because these activities expose the community to a greater risk of injury than many other
compensation
government activities, the financial impact from 8 providing
3
may impose an undue burden on the government.
The basic rationale for immunizing unique functions is that these
activities are particularly beneficial to society and should therefore be
protected from the effects of liability. Yet it has been suggested that since
society benefits from both unique and nonunique governmental functions,

79. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 176-77. See generally 2 HARm & JAMES,
supra note 33, at 761-77.
80. See Decade of Change, supra note 57, at 921. See generally Comment, The
Role of The Courts In Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964 DuKE L.J. 888
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Role of the Courts]. See also Leflar & Kantrowitz,
supra note 1, at 1414, where the authors state:
[Tihe accepted social policy is that the [private] employer, who ordinarily is
big enough to carry the risk either by self-insurance or by a liability policy covering his whole operation, should carry it, and that the employee, who ordinarily
is not financially big enough to handle the risk, will not be held. The economic
basis for this policy is as applicable to employees of the state and its subdivisions
as to employees of private corporations.
81. See, e.g., Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 177; Note, Need for Reform,
supra note 36, at 250.
82. See Decade of Change, supra note 57, at 922-23; Note, Need for Reform,
supra note 36, at 250; Comment, Role of the Courts, supra note 80, at 894.
Some functions are so unique to government and so necessary to society that
the government cannot discontinue an unprofitable activity as private companies can
and often do. For an example of private industry terminating an unprofitable line of
business, see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 275 Md. 130,
339 A.2d 291 (1975) (abandonment of medical malpractice insurance).
83. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 177; Comment, Role of the Courts, supra
note 80, at 893-94.
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the public should assume the cost of resulting injuries. 4 Further, there
is no evidence that unique operations of government would be curtailed
by the imposition of liability in this area. For example, in Maryland the
State Highway Administration is immune from liability for its torts, but
municipal governments engaged in identical functions of control, maintenance, and operation of roads are liable because their activities constitute
proprietary functions.8 5 Although society benefits from highway maintenance8 6 whether the performance is by a state or by a municipal government, the injured plaintiff may recover only when the tortfeasor is a
municipality. That municipalities have continued to function despite the
imposition of liability for negligent performance of these operations indicates that the "unique functions" rationale for immunity is not unassailable.
Certainly, the state must be able to carry out these unique activities,
but it is not clear that their continued performance requires absolute
immunity. One solution might be to lower the standard of care required
of government officials, employees, and agencies conducting unique government functions. A standard might immunize the agencies or officials
performing the unique function if they were able to demonstrate a substantial basis for believing that their conduct was reasonable and proper
under the circumstances. Such a subjective standard of care would allow
an injured party to recover when the government acted unreasonably but
would limit the scope of the state's liability, thus enabling the state to
87
perform those high risk functions essential to society.
Discretionary Functions

The final policy justification for sovereign immunity is that the threat
of liability might hamper the effective exercise of discretionary functions
8
and impair the free and unfettered decision-making of the government.
Of the various policy considerations, the discretionary function issue has
attracted the greatest degree of general agreement. Few contend that all
84. Cf. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT 482 (3d ed. 1972) (the government
should compensate persons for injuries resulting from the performance of government
activity). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 33, at 1612.
85. Compare State v. Rich, 126 Md. 643, 95 A. 956 (1915) (State Roads Commission held immune) with County Comm'rs v. Broadwaters, 69 Md. 533, 16 A. 223
(1888) (municipality held not immune). See Comment, Municipal Responsibility in
Tort in Maryland, 3 MD. L. Rav. 159 (1939).
86. Highway maintenance has been considered a unique governmental function.
See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
87. This standard is analogous to the subjective standard of care required of a
police officer with respect to the tort of false imprisonment in cases involving felonies.
A warrantless arrest by a police officer is not tortious where he has reasonable grounds
(probable cause) to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person
arrested has committed it. See Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App. 515, 243 A.2d 879
(1968). Compare Shaw v. May Department Stores Co., 268 A.2d 607 (D.C. App.
1970) with Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 261 A.2d 731 (1970).
88. See note 37 supra. See generally notes 127-34 and accompanying text infra.
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discretionary functions should be open to liability. Indeed, the public
interest in the efficient operation of government requires that public officials
make discretionary decisions, for "it is not a tort for the government to
govern."8' 9 Although it has been stated that immunity generally "fosters
neglect and breeds irresponsibility, while liability promotes [the] care
and caution" 90 that avoid future tortious conduct, the deterrence gained
through imposition of liability might exert an in terrorem effect upon the
willingness of public officials to execute their duties with the necessary
decisiveness and judgment. 91 Allowing a court or jury to substitute its
views for those of the decision makers and then to award damages against
the agency or officials might result in overly cautious government.92
In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Federal Tort Claims Act expressly
93
recognizes a discretionary function exception.
LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO ABROGATION

Once it is determined that alteration in the immunity doctrine is
desirable, the proper statute must be chosen. The degree or scope of
liability contained in the statute should reflect the cost of liability, both in
terms of adverse judgments and the curtailment of other state programs,
and the impact of liability upon the effective administration of state government. 94 There are four basic approaches to the abrogation of sovereign
immunity and the establishment of a system for providing relief. First,
thirteen states, including Maryland, retain their common law immunity;
injuries suffered as a result of tortious conduct by the state are uncom89. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953)

(Jackson, J., dissenting).

See generally James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary Function"
Exception:The Sluggish Retreat on an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 184
(1957).
90. Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 13, 152 S.E.2d 485, 493
(1967), quoted in Note, Has The Rationale Disappearedt,supra note 22, at 255.
91. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1974).
92. Compare Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 180-81 with Decade of Change,
supra note 57, at 922-23. See generally SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 37,
at 247-49.
A discussion of the discretionary functions of the state necessarily touches
upon the doctrine of official immunity, which is related to, but distinct from, sovereign
immunity. When a suit is filed against a state agency, the conduct alleged to be
tortious will often be a direct result of a discretionary decision by an official. The
official's immunity is not always as broad as that which protects the state; if a
showing of malice is made, the official will be deemed to have acted outside his official
capacity, and may be subject to personal liability. See, e.g., Eliason v. Funk, 233
Md. 351, 196 A.2d 887 (1964).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). For a discussion of the interpretation of the
discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see notes 129 to
134 and accompanying text infra.
94. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 37, at 269-70; Note, Need for
Reform, supra note 36, at 248-49.
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pensated. 95 Several of these states provide relief in extremely limited
areasY6 Second, ten states retain their traditional sovereign immunity,
but provide limited relief through administrative claims boards or special
courts of claims.97 Third, another eighteen states have completely waived
their immunity and allow recourse to the courts in the same fashion as in
actions against private party defendants.98 Finally, nine states provide for

95. Delaware [DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 9; Pajewski v. Perry, 320 A.2d 763 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1974)1; Louisiana [LA. CONST. art. 3, § 35; Alford v. North-Central Area
Vocational Technical School, 298 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 1974), rev'd sub nom. on
other grounds, Hill v. North-Central Area Vocational Technical School, 310 So. 2d 104
(La. 1975)]; Maine [Austin W. Jones Co. v. State, 119 A. 577 (Me. 1923)]; Maryland [Jekofsky v. State, 264 Md. 471, 287 A.2d 40 (1972); Davis v. State, 183 Md.
385, 37 A.2d 880 (1944); State v. Rich, 126 Md. 643, 95 A. 956 (1915)]; Michigan
[Mintz v. State, 336 Mich. 370, 58 N.W.2d 106 (1953)]; Mississippi [Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-45-1 (1972)]; Missouri [Mo. CONsT. art. 3, § 39 (4)]; New Hampshire
[Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 546, 134 A.2d 279 (1957)]; North Dakota [State
v. Lowe, 210 N.W. 501 (N.D. 1926)]; Oklahoma [Rector v. State, 495 P.2d 826
(Okla. 1972)]; Pennsylvania [PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11; art. 3, § 26; Hart v. Spectrum
Arena, Inc., 329 A.2d 311 (Pa. 1974)]; South Carolina [S.C. CoNST. art. 17, § 2;
Brazell v. City of Camden, 238 S.C. 580, 121 S.E.2d 221 (1961)]; Wisconsin [Wis.
CONST. art. 4, § 27; Cords v. State, 620 Wis. 2d 42, 214 N.W.2d 405 (1974)].
96. See, e.g., Louisiana [LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:22 (West 1971) (Department
of Highways may be sued)]; Maryland [MD. ANN. CODE art. 62C, § 5b (1972)
(liability of Baltimore-Washington International Airport Authority); art. 64B, § 49
(1972) (liability of Metropolitan Transit Authority)]; South Carolina [S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 10-2621 to -2625 (1975 Cum. Supp.) (liability for injuries caused by state
motor vehicles) ].
97. Alabama [ALA. CODE tit. 55, §§ 333-44 (1960)]; Arkansas [ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-1401 to -1406 (1968)1; Georgia [GA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-504 to -510 (1974)];
Illinois [ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 439.1-25 (Smith-Hurd 1972)]; Kansas [KAN.

STAT. ANN. 46-901 to -911 (1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975)]; Kentucky [Ky.
REV. ANN. §§ 44.010-990 (1969)]; Minnesota [MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.66.84
(1967)]; Tennessee [TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-801 to -818 (1973), as amended, (Cum.
Supp. 1975)]; Virginia [VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-223.1 to -223.6 (1973)]; West Virginia [W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-1 to 14-2-29 (1972)].
98. Alaska [ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1973) ]; Arizona [Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 12-821 to -826 (1956)]; Colorado [CoLo. REV. STAT, ANN. §§ 24-10-101 to
24-10-117 (1947)1; Florida [FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (1976 Cum. Supp.)]; Hawaii
[HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 661-1 to -11 (1968)]; Idaho [IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-901 to
-928 (1975 Cum. Supp.)]; Indiana [IND. CODE § 34-4-16-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. §
3-3401, Burns, 1973)]; Massachusetts [MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 1 (1968)];

New Jersey [N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to § 59:12-3 (1976 Cum. Supp.) (court of
claims)]; New Mexico [N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-6-18 to 8-22 (1974)1; New York
[N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1963) (court of claims)]; Ohio [OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2743.01 to .20 (Supp. 1975)]; Oregon [ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260 to .300
(1975)]; Rhode Island [R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-31-1 (1975 Cum. Supp.)]; Texas
[TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 § 4 (Vernon 1970)]; Vermont [VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12 § 5601 (1973)]; Washington [WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.010 (1962) as

amended (1975 Cur.
Cum. Supp.) ].

Supp.)]; Wyoming [Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1018.1

(1975

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

judicial relief but require the injured party to seek initial redress before
administrative claims boards. 99
In those states that have provided some form of administrative or
judicial relief, the waiver of immunity has followed one of three approaches.
One jurisdiction, New York, provides a blanket waiver of immunity that
enumerates no substantive exceptions or limitations. 10° A second approach,
characterized as closed-end liability, 10 1 uses statutes that expressly retain
sovereign immunity except for specifically enumerated causes of action. 102
Finally, many jurisdictions provide for a general waiver of immunity open-end liability 03 - with enumerated exceptions for which immunity
has been retained.104
There are two variations of blanket waiver statutes. One method
simply grants statutory permission to "sue and be sued." The Court of
Appeals of Maryland has held that an effective waiver must satisfy two
conditions: there must be an express provision or necessary implication
from a statute indicating that the legislature intended to waive sovereign
immunity and there must be funds with which to satisfy tort judgments. 10 5
Therefore, this formulation would not achieve abrogation of immunity in
Maryland. Another method is an express blanket waiver of sovereign
immunity with the provision of funds to pay awards. A possible blanket
waiver statute would read:
The State of Maryland hereby waives its immunity from liability and
suit and assumes liability. Such liability shall be determined according
to the same rules of tort law as applied by the Maryland courts to
individuals and corporations. 06
99. California [CAL. GOVT CODE § 945.4 (West 1966)] ; Connecticut [CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4-141 to -165 (1969)]; Iowa [IowA CODE § 25A.1 to .20 (1967)];
Montana [MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 82-4301 to -4327 (1975 Cum. Supp.)]; Nebraska
24-319 (1974)1; Nevada [NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 41.031 to 41.039
(1973)]; North Carolina [N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291; § 143-293 (1974)]; South
[REv. STAT. NEB.

Dakota [S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-32-1, 21-32-10 (1969)]; Utah [UTAH

§ 63-30-1 to -30-34 (1968)].
100. N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8 (McKinney, 1963).

CODE ANN.

101. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 179.
102. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815 to 996.6 (West 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59:1-1 to 1-7 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
103. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 179.
104. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.265 (1975). The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680 (1975) is also an open-end liability statute.
105. Lohr v. Upper Potomac River Comm'n, 180 Md. 584, 589-91, 26 A.2d 547,
548-49 (1942). A statutory scheme that did not provide funds might do more harm
than good. While it would encourage the filing of suits, it would not provide for
recovery, and thus it would "[do] no more than allow plaintiffs to visit the courthouse." Leflar & Kantrowitz, mtpra note 1, at 1365.
106. This is modeled after the N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8 (McKinney 1963).
If enacted, such a statute would necessarily include a mechanism for the provision of
funds with which to satisfy judgments.
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The advantage of the blanket waiver approach is that it would allow the
body of tort law applied when the state is a party defendant to parallel
current tort law for nongovernmental defendants. Such an approach would
obviate the need for extensive legislative consideration of the merits of
each possible exception; instead, the judiciary would be left with the
determination whether sufficient care had been exercised by a defendant
in a particular factual setting. Under such a broad statute, however, the
judiciary would be responsible for balancing all policy considerations beyond the rule of general liability. 10 7 The government's ability to perform
its functions might be hindered by the initial uncertainty about the type of
conduct that would incur liability.' 08 Such uncertainty would also interfere with state budgeting because of the difficulty in predicting annual
liability. Moreover, the cost of commercial insurance might become prohibitive because the carriers would have to provide coverage against the outer
range of potential exposure. 10 9 Finally, a blanket waiver does not provide
exceptions for discretionary and uniquely governmental functions. Although such functions may merit continued immunity, there is no guarantee
that the judiciary will create an exception to the waiver and grant immunity
in those areas." 0
At the other extreme of the consent statutes is the closed-end approach,
which expressly retains immunity except for enumerated areas in which
it is waived."' Such a statute restricts the opportunity for judicial policy
making, and its certainty would enable private citizens and the government
to plan their activities more effectively. A closed-end statute constitutes
a legislative declaration that immunity is the general rule and liability is
the exception. Such a statute reflects a determination by the legislature
that broad exposure to liability is financially impracticable or otherwise
undesirable. This system of liability would require the legislature to
review each element of the state's exposure to liability. One likely consequence of this review would be an insurance premium lower than the
other two statutory models because the scope of liability would be specifically enumerated and therefore fairly predictable." 2 But a closed-end
statute is extremely difficult to formulate; an exceptionally large amount
of time would be required in order to adequately consider each potential
107.
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STUDY,

supra

note 37, at 267-68; see Van Alstyne,

supra note 36, at 467; Note Need for Reform, supra note 36, at 250-51.
108. See Van Alstyne, supra note 36, at 469.
109. See Note, Retention of the Administrative Settlement, 15 DE PAUL L. REv.
355, 359 (1966). See also Note Need for Reform, supra note 36, at 249.
110. For discussion of unique governmental functions see notes 81 to 87 and
accompanying text supra. For discussion of discretionary functions see notes 130 to
135 and accompanying text infra.
111. Typical statutes of this closed-end category include N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59:1-1 to 59:12-3 (1976 Cum. Supp.) and CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).
As with the other statutory models this approach would include an express provision
of funds with which to satisfy judgments.
112. See Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 179-80.
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cause of action and the resulting legislation would be voluminous. Further,
the innumerable factual patterns that could be encountered by courts
applying such a statute might expose situations unanticipated by the legislature; absent a clear statement of legislative purpose, the courts might
continue to immunize those areas on the theory that the designation of
specific liability by the legislature was intended to be exclusive." 3
Open-end liability, or selective immunity, combines the advantages of
the blanket waiver and closed-end approaches but avoids the disadvantages.
A typical open-end statute would read in part:
§ A. Subject to the exceptions enumerated in section B, the State
of Maryland is liable for its torts and those of the State's agencies,
instrumentalities, and employees, acting within the scope of their
authority or employment.11 4
The selection of an open-end statute by the legislature would achieve the
objective of circumscribed liability, but would avoid the meticulous consideration that a closed-end scheme demands; it is easier for a legislature
to specify those areas in which sovereign immunity is to be retained than
to sift through the numerous areas in which immunity might be waived.' 1 5
Moreover, because this approach avoids the detailed enumeration of a
closed-end statute, the courts possess more flexibility for dealing with new
and unusual situations." 6 Accordingly, it would appear that the openended scheme would be the best approach.
113. Note, Need for Reform, supra note 36, at 254.
The opportunity for the Maryland General Assembly to give adequate attention to such a voluminous bill is considerably less than in states such as California
and New Jersey, which have enacted closed-end liability statutes. The Maryland
General Assembly meets for only ninety days, whereas the legislative sessions in
California and New Jersey are year-long. Compare MD. CONST. art. 3, § 15(a)
(1972) with N.J. CoNsT. art. 4, § 1 3 (1971) and CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9020 (West
1966).
114. This is modeled after ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.265 (1975). Florida's statute is in
the category of open-ended statutes, but has relatively few limitations or exceptions.

See FLA.

STAT. ANN.

§ 768.28 (Cum. Supp. 1976).

The Court of Appeals has held that no abrogation will take effect unless
funds are specifically provided by the legislature to satisfy judgments, see note 105
and accompanying text supra. Accordingly, the statute should contain a provision
requiring the state to allocate funds for that purpose. The language of the recently
enacted statute abrogating the doctrine of sovereign immunity in contract, 1976
Laws of Md., ch. 450, at 1180, might be adequate:
In order to provide for the implementation of this section, the Governor
annually shall provide in the State budget adequate funds for the satisfaction of
any final judgment, after the exhaustion of any right of appeal, which has been
rendered against the State, or any officer, department, agency, board, commission,
or other unit of government in an action in contract as provided in this section.
1976 Laws of Md., ch. 450, at 1182.
115. Note, Need for Reform, supra note 36, at 254.
116. See Tort Liability of Local Government, supra note 54; Ross, State Immunity and the Arkansas Claims Commission, 21 AMK. L. REv. 180 (1970); Van
Alstyne, supra note 36, at 467.
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An open-end approach statute would specify several exceptions. In
addition to the general provision waiving immunity, 117 the statute might
provide:
§ B. The State shall retain its immunity in all circumstances for:
(1) any claim arising out of the exercise or failure to exercise
a discretionary act or function or decision or duty on the
part of a State officer or employee, which act or function or
decision or duty involves the exercise of judgment requiring
policy determinations ;ns8

(2) any claim arising out of an act or omission of the State
in the exercise or failure to exercise an act or function or
decision or duty which is uniquely governmental in nature including, but not limited to law enforcement, fire fighting,
incarceration, licensing, and quarantine, but not including
highway or road construction or maintenance - in which
there is a substantial basis that the individuals performing
such unique function believed their conduct to be reasonable
under the circumstances." 9
It has been argued that a blanket waiver approach grants too much discretion to the judiciary 12 0 and leaves the government too vulnerable to
suit. These objections do not undermine an open-end statute, however,
because the exceptions to the waiver of immunity under the open-end
approach outline the perimeters "within which a court, in the context of
a specific factual situation, can balance the policies in favor of governmental
immunity against the social value of distributing individual losses among
the body of taxpayers."' 21 Furthermore, the jurisdictions that have adopted
open-end liability have not experienced disastrous financial consequences;
117. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
118. This is modeled after the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) and
(h) (1970), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. IV 1974).
119. This is modeled after the statute proposed by the writer of Note, Need for
Reform, supra note 36, at 256.
Under this statutory scheme, tortious conduct involving road building and
highway maintenance would not be immunized as a unique governmental function.
There are several reasons for this. First, much of the litigation in which sovereign
immunity has provided a bar to recovery has involved the state activities of building, maintenance, or operation of roads. See e.g., Jekofsky v. State, 264 Md. 471,
287 A.2d 40 (1972); Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 260 A.2d 295
(1970); State v. Rich, 126 Md. 643, 95 A. 956 (1915). Second, municipal governments are not immune for tortious conduct arising out of building, maintenance, or
operation of their roads. See notes 85 to 86 and accompanying text supra. Third,
building and maintenance would appear less dangerous than law enforcement or fire
fighting, and are therefore less inherently unique to government, as evidenced by the
fact that road-building functions are often contracted to commercial enterprise.
120. See Van Alstyne, supra note 36, at 467; Note, Need for Reform, supra note
36, at 250-51.
121. Note, Need for Reform, supra note 36, at 254.
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the open-end scheme therefore appears to present a reasonable financial
1 22
alternative to complete immunity.
Exceptions
There are three generally recognized exceptions to an open-end
statute that are consistent with policy considerations concerned with
minimizing the burden on government operations. The first exception
grants immunity for intentional torts. Of the three exceptions, the one
for intentional torts is perhaps least compelling; retention of this immunity
has not been explained beyond a balancing of the financial and administrative cost to government against the social policy of compensating innocent
victims for their injuries. Those who oppose the retention of immunity
for intentional torts argue that there is little evidence that liability would
deter competent people from seeking government positions or that liability
would encumber the decision-making process of officials.'12 Immunity in
this area seems to have the illogical result that the state would be liable
for negligence but would be immune for conduct involving intent, a more
culpable state of mind;124 in the private sector, on the other hand, there
is liability for both negligent and intentional conduct. 125 Many jurisdictions have simply chosen to limit their liability to negligent conduct,
leaving the tort victim the option of attempting to sue the official directly.
In this respect, it is significant that Congress recently amended the Federal
Tort Claims Act to eliminate the exception for intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers of the United States. 126 Since it is
not clear why the balance has been struck in favor of retaining immunity
in this area, the proposed statute provides no exception for intentional
torts.
A second exception provides immunity for discretionary functions.
Such an exception would be desirable because judicial scrutiny of every
government decision might induce excessive caution. 127 The governmental
process requires uninhibited decision making, 128 and it is difficult to justify
122. But see Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 179.
123. LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 15.
124. An exception for intentional torts does not necessarily leave the victim without a remedy. Instead of suing the state, the tort victim might seek to recover
directly from the individual tortfeasor.
125. See Note, Distinction Between Intentional and Negligent Conduct Under
Tort Claims Act, 35 N.C.L. RaV. 564, 567 (1957).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. IV 1974) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(1970)). That Congress felt compelled to restrict the scope of the originally broad
exception for intentional torts raises doubts about the continued wisdom of such
an exception. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (damage remedy based directly on the Constitution
recognized against federal agents who violated the fourth amendment).
127. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 37, at 181.
128. See notes 88 to 93 and accompanying text supra. Many government duties
require policy determinations and involve calculated risks. Decisions often reflect
existing circumstances and pressures. Government officials may become overly cautious
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penalizing or inhibiting the government in its reasonable efforts to implement general social policies. Shielding discretionary functions under a
closed-end statute would be difficult because it would entail the treacherous
task of identifying and excluding all nondiscretionary conduct. An exception for discretionary functions under a blanket waiver statute would
be even more problematic because there is no guarantee that the judiciary
would immunize the proper range of discretionary functions, or any discretionary functions at all.
The Federal Tort Claims Act retains immunity for the performance
of discretionary functions. 129 In order to qualify for this discretionary
function exception, the activity must involve the exercise of judgment
concerning a matter of policy.' 30 In interpreting this discretionary function immunity' 8 ' the Supreme Court has distinguished between operational and planning-level decisions. 18 2 In Dalehite v. United States,13 the
Court held that "discretion" under the Act "includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by
executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision
there is discretion."'13 Construction of the term "discretionary" under any
if courts or juries are allowed to award damages by substituting their judgment for
that of the officials on policy matters.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2 680(a) (1970) provides that the abrogation of immunity does
not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.
130. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34 (1953); Griffin v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d Cir. 1974); Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774
(2d Cir. 1969) ; Eastern Air-Lines, Inc.. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.
1955), rev'd on other grounds, 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970).
132. Cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955) (maintenance of a navigational light by the United States Coast Guard considered an "operational" function for which liability would attach upon proof of negligence).
133. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). This suit was brought to recover damages from the
United States for the death of a man who was killed by an explosion of fertilizer
manufactured under government specifications. The Court decided that the government's role had been discretionary and did not hold it liable for the injuries.
134. Id. at 35-36 (footnote omitted). In Seaboard Coastline R.R. v. United
States, 473 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973), the court held that the government was liable
for damage caused by the negligent design of a drainage ditch on the ground that this
was an operational function. "Once the government decided to build a drainage ditch,
it was no longer exercising a discretionary policy-making function and it was required
to perform the operational function of building the drainage ditch in a non-negligent
manner." Id. at 716. The court noted, however, that the original decision to construct
the system was a judgment involving policy considerations and therefore was within
the scope of the discretionary function exception.
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future Maryland legislative enactment should parallel the interpretation
of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Adoption of the Dalehite standard would
ensure that the immunized conduct was an essential component of the
decision-making process at the planning level. Accordingly, an appropriate
statutory abrogation of the doctrine would immunize the performance of
truly discretionary functions but would narrowly define the perimeters of
protected conduct so that only planning-level decisions, requiring the
exercise of judgment, would be exempted.
A third possible exception to an open-ended scheme would preserve
the immunity for unique governmental functions. 13 5 This unique function
exception ensures that the government would not incur massive financial
burdens and administrative interference in the performance of essential
public functions. As in the case of the exception for the performance of
discretionary activities, a blanket waiver statute could not ensure that the
judiciary would fashion a unique governmental function exception. Similarly, it would be nearly impossible for the General Assembly to identify
every general government function not a unique function, 3 6 as would
be required under the closed-end approach. It thus appears that the openend formulation best provides well-defined immunity in the desired areas,
avoids placing unreasonable demands on the legislature, and offers reasonable guidance to the judiciary.
Judicial or Administrative Tribunal
Those jurisdictions that have either abrogated the doctrine of sovereign
immunity or have provided other forms of recovery'8 7 provide relief by
three different methods: claims boards, judicial relief in the courts of
general jurisdiction, and judicial relief in special courts of claims.
Claims boards have been used primarily where the jurisdiction has
chosen to retain immunity but permits limited recourse against the state.13 8
Under a typical claims board statute, the claimant presents his case to
the board, which operates according to informal rules of evidence. There
is usually no right of appeal to the judiciary, and the board findings bind
the legislature only if the legislature has provided a fund from which the
board's awards can be satisfied.' 39 Recommendations and findings of the
board are ordinarily reported to the legislature, which may accept, reject,
or modify the board's decisions. The claims board approach thus does not
1 40
compensate every person who is able to establish the state's liability.
135. See notes 81 to 87 and accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 112 to 113 and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 95 to 99 and accompanying text supra.
138. See generally, Ross, supra note 116, at 180; Note, Retention of the Administrative Settlement, 15 DEPAUL L. REv. 355, 360-61 (1966).
139. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 239-40. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.73
(1967).
140. See Note, State Immunity from Suit, supra note 38, at 882-83; Leflar &
Kantrowitz, supra note 1, at 1364, 1412.
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Achieving the first of the two reasons for imposing tort liability - com141
pensation of injured persons - is therefore problematic.
Although the claims board procedure appears to be an adequate
method for processing smaller and uncomplicated claims, 142 the inconvenience of creating an additional bureaucracy, and the expense and time needed
to develop the board's expertise in handling litigation may not be warranted
because a fully developed judicial system already exists. Moreover, legislative consideration of hundreds of claims recommendations by the claims
board might result in ineffective handling because of the time constraints
placed on the legislature. 43 Another reason for avoiding legislative approval or disapproval of claims is that the legislature may be susceptible
to influences, such as constituent pressure, that are not relevant to a
proper determination of the substantive liability of the state. 1 44 One of
the chief reasons for assigning all claims to the same tribunal is to obtain
consistent decisions and to establish a standard by which the state, its
agencies, instrumentalities, and employees can gauge their conduct. Administrative boards traditionally act on a case-by-case basis; where there
is legislative modification of the board's findings, clear precedents are not
likely to be established. It therefore becomes difficult to forecast the
proper scope of future permissible conduct. The second of the two reasons
for imposing tort liability - the deterrent effect - is thus diminished. 45
A primary consideration in deciding whether to establish a special
court of claims or to rely on courts of general jurisdiction is the amount
of anticipated litigation.' 46 The volume of litigation is difficult to forecast,
though the form of immunity waiver that appears to best satisfy Maryland's
needs - the open-end liability - might produce a wide range of litigation. 147 The assignment of tort actions against the state to a special court
of claims would likely result in speedier trials and would not burden further
the already overcrowded dockets of the present judiciary. Additionally, a
court of claims system might allow a tribunal to develop expertise in
handling claims against the state. It is not possible to predict whether
141. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
142. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 240.
143. Attorney General's Task Force on Sovereign Immunity, Report of the
Attorney General's Task Force on Sovereign Immunity 12-14 (May 1972) [herein-

after cited as Attorney General's Report]. (The report is on file at the Maryland
Law Review.)
Some have suggested that members of a claims board, because of the sources
from which they are often drawn, are likely to be too sensitive to demands for
austerity with respect to government funds. See Ross, supra note 116, at 187; Note,
State Immunity from Suit, supra note 38, at 884.
144. See Note, State Immunity from Suit, supra note 38, at 884.

145. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
146. See Note, Need for Reform, supra note 36, at 254.
147. See Attorney General's Report, supra note 143, at 12.

It is noteworthy

that the New York Court of Claims has created an extensive bureaucracy and has a
huge operating budget. N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8 (McKinney 1963).
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the amount of litigation would be so extensive as to require a separate
court system. The California Law Revision Commission in its study of
the implications of abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine determined that many jurisdictions have successfully handled the suits through
their courts of general jurisdiction. 148 This question whether to establish
a separate judicial structure will likely remain unresolved until experience
indicates its necessity; thus, it may be prudent initially to allow recourse to
the present courts rather than to establish an entirely new court system.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of sovereign immunity was transformed from the personal prerogative of the king into the automatic prerogative of the state.
Over time, the primary reasons advanced for retaining the doctrine have
been considerations of public policy. Analysis of these policy justifications
reveals that they cannot prevail against opposing arguments. The predominant trend in the United States toward providing compensation to
tort victims makes it more difficult to justify the current application of
immunity in Maryland. It is necessary, however, to ensure that the
operational and economic well-being of the state is not impaired as a
consequence of abrogating the doctrine. Therefore, the General Assembly
should enact legislation abrogating the broad doctrine of sovereign immunity 149 and establishing an open-end form of liability that provides for
immunity in two narrowly defined areas - unique functions and discretionary acts.
148.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY,

supra note 37, at 316.

149. It is noteworthy that the Sovereign Immunity Committee of the Bar Association of Baltimore City has recommended legislative abrogation of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. See Recommendations of Sovereign Immunity Committee, March
19, 1976, attached to letter from Edward C. Mackie, Chairman of the Sovereign
Immunity Committee of the Bar Association of Baltimore City, to Jeffrey B. Smith,
President of the Bar Association of Baltimore City, March 19, 1976. (The letter
and recommendations are on file at the Maryland Law Review.)

